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Abstract. In this paper we present eﬃcient implementations of several code-based identiﬁcation
schemes, namely the Stern scheme, the Véron scheme and the Cayrel-Véron-El Yousﬁ scheme. We
also explain how to derive and implement signature schemes from the previous identiﬁcation schemes
using the Fiat-Shamir transformation. For a security of 80 bits and a document to be signed of size 1
kByte, we reach a signature in about 4 ms on a standard CPU.
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1 Introduction
Identification schemes are very useful and fundamental tools in many applications such as electronic fund
transfer and online systems for preventing data access by invalid users. Such schemes are typical applications
of zero-knowledge interactive proofs [15], which are two-party protocols allowing a party called a prover to
convince another party called a verifier, that it knows some secret piece of information, without the verifier
being able to learn anything about the secret value except for what is revealed by the prover itself. Zero-
knowledge identification schemes are of particular interest because it is possible to convert them into secure
signature schemes through the very famous Fiat-Shamir paradigm [13].
Quantum computation arises much interest in cryptography, since Peter Shor found a polynomial-time
algorithm to solve the factoring and discrete logarithm problems using quantum computers [21]. Therefore,
it is of extreme importance to come up with cryptosystems that remain secure even when the adversary
has access to a quantum computer; such systems are called post-quantum cryptosystems. One promising
candidate is based on codes, since no quantum attack exists so far to solve the syndrome decoding problem
on which the code-based cryptosystems are based.
Besides the fact that designing code-based identification schemes offer security against quantum attacks,
these schemes have other good features. First, they are usually very fast and easy to implement compared to
schemes based on number-theoretic problems as they use only matrix-vector multiplications. Second, their
security is directly related to the syndrome decoding problem. Finally, the complexity of attacks against
code-based identification schemes can be given in the expected number of binary operations and not only
through asymptotic estimations, as in the case of lattice-based cryptosystems for example.
In 1993, Stern proposed in [23] the first efficient zero-knowledge identification scheme based on the
hardness of the binary syndrome decoding problem. A few years later, Véron in [25] has designed a scheme
with a lower communication cost. Recently, Cayrel-Véron-El Yousfi in [11] have designed a scheme which
reduces this communication cost even more.
Code-based cryptosystems suffer from a major drawback: they require a very large public key which makes
them very difficult to use in many practical situations. Using quasi-cyclic and quasi-dyadic constructions,
several new constructions like [4, 17] permits to reduce the size of the public matrices. Recently, there have
been several structural attacks against such constructions, the first attack presented by Gauthier et al. in [24]
and the second attack is due to Faugère et al. [12]; these attacks extract the private key of some parameters
of these variants. We should mention that schemes using binary codes are so far unaffected by such attacks.
Our contribution In this paper we provide efficient implementations of the Stern, the Véron and the Cayrel-
Véron-El Yousfi schemes. We also explain how to derive signature schemes from the previous identification
schemes using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. In a previous work [9], we have used Keccak [14] for the generation
orandom vectors and hash values. Now we use RFSB [8] for the same purpose and juxtapose the results.
In [10], the authors presented a smart implementation of the Stern scheme, but it was more a proof of concept
than an efficient implementation.
Organization of the paper First, we give in Section 2 a general overview of code-based cryptography.
Section 3 describes the Stern, Véron and Cayrel-Véron-El Yousfi (CVE) schemes. The results of our imple-
mentations will be described in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Background of Coding Theory
In this section, we recall basic facts about code-based cryptography. We refer to [6] for a general introduction
to these issues.
2.1 Definitions
Linear codes are k-dimensional subspaces of an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field Fq, where k and
n are positive integers with k < n, and q a prime power. The theoretical error-correcting capability of such
a code is the maximum number ω of errors that the code is able to decode. In short, linear codes with these
parameters are denoted (n, k)-codes or (n, n− r)-codes, where r is the codimension of a code with r = n−k.
Definition 1 (Hamming weight). The (Hamming) weight of an arbitrary vector x ∈ Fnq is the number of
its non-zero entries. We use wt(x) to denote the Hamming weight of x.
The distance of vectors x, y ∈ Fnq is defined as wt(x−y). The weight of x ∈ F
n
q is therefore just its distance
from the null-vector 0 ∈ Fnq . The minimal distance of a linear code C is defined as d := minx∈C,x 6=0 wt(x).
The error-correcting capability of a linear code C can be expressed as ω = ⌊d−12 ⌋.
Definition 2 (Generator and Parity Check Matrix). Let C be a linear (n, k)-code over Fq. A matrix
G ∈ Fk×nq is called a generator matrix of C if its rows form a basis of C:
C = {xG : x ∈ Fkq}.
Vectors x ∈ C are called codewords. A matrix H ∈ Fr×nq is called a parity-check matrix of C if
C = {x ∈ Fnq : Hx
T = 0}.
In other words, H is a parity-check matrix, if GHT = 0 holds. A parity-check matrix H generates the dual
space C⊥ of C, the space perpendicular to C.
As we have already mentioned, there have been some proposals to use quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic codes
in order to reduce the public key size of code-based cryptosystems. The idea is to replace codes having a
random parity-check matrix H by particular type of codes with a very compact representation, namely
quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic codes. In both variants, the matrix has the form H = (Ir|R), where Ir denotes
the r × r identity matrix and R ∈ Fr×kq is a quasi-circulant respectively quasi-dyadic matrix. A quasi-cyclic
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matrix (resp. quasi-dyadic matrix) is a block matrix whose component blocks are circulant (resp. dyadic)
submatrices.
A circulant matrix is defined by a vector (a1, a2, . . . , ar) ∈ F
r
q and has the following form:
R =


a1 a2 a3 . . . ar
ar a1 a2 . . . ar−1
...
...
...
...
...
a2 a3 a4 . . . a1

 .
A dyadic matrix is recursively defined: any 1× 1 matrix is dyadic and for p > 1, a 2p× 2p dyadic matrix has
the form:
R =
(
B C
C B
)
,
where B and C are 2p−1 × 2p−1 dyadic matrices. To give an example, an 4 × 4 dyadic matrix has the
following form:
R =


a b c d
b a d c
c d a b
d c b a

 ,
where a, b, c, d ∈ Fq.
The advantage of a circulant resp. dyadic matrix is the fact that the whole matrix can be reconstructed
from the knowledge of its first row alone. This is the trick to reduce a public key element.
We describe in the following the main hard problems on which the security of code-based schemes pre-
sented in this paper relies. We denote by x
$
←− A the uniform random choice of x among the elements of a
set A, and "⊕" the exclusive disjunction (XOR) operation.
Definition 3 (Binary Syndrome Decoding Problem (SD)).
Input : H
$
←− Fr×n2 , y
$
←− Fr2, and an integer ω > 0.
Find : a word s ∈ Fn2 such that wt(s) ≤ ω and Hs
T = y.
This problem was proven to be NP-hard in 1978 [5]. A dual version of the previous problem, using the
generator matrix G instead of the parity-check matrix H of the code C, can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (General Decoding Problem (GD)).
Input : G
$
←− Fk×n2 , y
$
←− Fn2 , and an integer ω > 0.
Find : A pair (m, e) ∈ Fk2 × F
n
2 , where wt(e) ≤ ω s.t mG⊕ e = y.
Note that x := mG ∈ Fn2 for m ∈ F
k
2 is by definition a codeword. In other words, GD states that given
a vector y ∈ Fn2 , find the (unique) codeword x ∈ C, such that wt(x − y) is minimal. GD is also proven to
be NP-hard. Moreover, it is assumed that it is hard not only for some worst-case instances, but hard on
average.
An extension of the binary syndrome decoding (SD) problem over an arbitrary finite field can be formu-
lated as well. It was proven to be NP-hard by A. Barg in 1994 [2, in russian].
Definition 5 (q-ary Syndrome Decoding (qSD) problem).
Input : H
$
←− Fr×nq , y
$
←− Frq, and an integer ω > 0.
Find : a word s ∈ Fnq such that wt(s) ≤ ω and Hs
T = y.
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Best known attack. The most efficient known algorithm to attack code-based schemes is the Information
Set Decoding (ISD) algorithm. Some improvement of this algorithm have been developed by Peters [19],
Niebuhr et al. [18], and Bernstein et al. [7], and recently in [16] and [3]. The main idea of the ISD algorithm
consists in recovering the n− r information symbols as follows: the first step is to pick r of the n coordinates
randomly in the hope that most of them are error-free, then try to recover the message by solving an r × r
linear system (binary or over Fq). The recent results of this attack are taken into account when choosing our
parameters in order to determine the security level needed. We denote the workfactor of the Information Set
Decoding algorithm by WFISD.
3 Code-based zero-knowledge identification schemes
In code-based cryptography, there have been many attempts to design identification schemes. In such con-
structions, there are two main goals: on the one hand, a prover P wants to convince a verifier V of its
identity. On the other hand, P does not want to reveal any additional information that might be used by an
impersonator.
For a fixed positive integer n; let Sn denote the symmetric group of n! permutations on n symbols, and let
h be a public hash function. In the following, we will give an overview of three proposals in this area. The
symbol "||" denotes the concatenating operator.
3.1 Stern scheme
The first code-based zero-knowledge identification scheme was presented by Stern [23] at Crypto’93, its
security is based on the syndrome decoding (SD) problem.
Description The Stern scheme has two parts: a key generation algorithm, shown in Fig. 1, and an identi-
fication protocol as given in Fig. 2. It uses a public parity-check matrix H of the code over the binary field
F2.
KeyGen:
Let κ be the security parameter
Choose n, r, ω, such that WFISD(n, r, ω, 2) ≥ 2κ
H
$
←− Fr×n2
s
$
←− Fn2 , s.t. wt(s) = ω.
y ← HsT
Output (sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))
Fig. 1. Stern key generation algorithm.
The scheme is a multiple-rounds identification protocol, where each round is a three-pass interaction
between the prover and the verifier. A cheater has a probability of 2/3 per round to succeed in the protocol
without the knowledge of the secret key (sk). The number of rounds depends on the impersonation resistance
required. For instance to achieve the weak and strong authentication probabilities of 2−16 and 2−32 according
the norm ISO/IEC-9798-5, one needs respectively 28 and 56 rounds. Stern proposed another identification
protocol with five-pass [23] (like CVE in section 3.3), but it is inefficient.
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Prover P Verifier V
(sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))←− KeyGen
(h public hash function)
u
$
←− Fn2 , σ
$
←− Sn
c1 ← h
`
σ||HuT
´
c2 ← h (σ(u))
c3 ← h (σ(u⊕ s))
c1, c2, c3
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b −→ {0, 1, 2}
If b = 0:
σ, u
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 and c2
if b = 1:
σ, u⊕ s
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 and c3,
if b = 2:
σ(u), σ(s)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c2 and c3,
wt(s)
?
= ω
Note that HuT = H(u⊕ s)T + y
Fig. 2. Stern identiﬁcation protocol.
3.2 Véron scheme
In 1996, Véron proposed in [25] a dual version of Stern’s scheme, its security is based on general decoding
problem (GD).
Description The scheme uses a generator matrix instead of a parity-check matrix of the code, which has the
advantage to reduce slightly the communication costs. The Véron scheme, as the Stern’s one, is a multiple
rounds zero-knowledge protocol, where each round is a three-pass interaction between the prover and the
verifier, for which the success probability for a cheater is 2/3 in one round. The key generation algorithm
part Fig. 3 and the identification protocol part Fig. 4 of the Véron’s scheme are given as follows.
KeyGen:
Let κ be the security parameter
Choose n, k, and ω such that WFISD(n, k, ω, 2) ≥ 2κ
G←− Fk×n2
(m, e)←− Fk2 × F
n
2 , s.t. wt(e) = ω ((m, e) secret key)
y ← mG⊕ e (y public key)
Output (sk, pk) = ((m, e), (y,G, ω))
Fig. 3. Véron key generation algorithm.
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Prover P Verifier V
(sk, pk) = ((m, e), (y,G, ω))←− KeyGen
(h public hash function)
u
$
←− Fk2 , σ
$
←− Sn
c1 ← h (σ)
c2 ← h (σ((u⊕m)G))
c3 ← h (σ(uG⊕ y))
c1, c2, c3
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b −→ {0, 1, 2}
If b = 0:
σ, (u⊕m)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 and c2
if b = 1:
σ((u⊕m)G), σ(e)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c2 and c3,
wt(σ(e))
?
= ω
if b = 2:
σ, u
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 and c3,
Note that σ((u⊕m)G)⊕ σ(e) = σ(uG⊕ y)
Fig. 4. Véron identiﬁcation protocol.
3.3 CVE identification scheme
In 2010, Cayrel, Véron, and El Yousfi presented in [11] a five-pass identification protocol using q-ary codes
instead of binary codes.
In addition to the new way of computing the commitments, the idea of this protocol uses another im-
provement which is inspired by [20, 22]. The main achievement of this proposal is to decrease the cheating
probability of each round from 2/3 for the Stern and Véron schemes to 1/2. This allows to decrease the
communication complexity by obtaining the same impersonation probability in fewer rounds compared to
Stern and Véron constructions.
Furthermore, this scheme offers a small public key size, about 4 kBytes, whereas that of Stern and Véron
scheme is almost 15 kBytes for the same level of security. It is proven in [11] that this scheme verifies
the zero-knowledge proof and its security is based on the hardness of the q-ary Syndrome Decoding (qSD)
problem.
Before presenting the CVE identification scheme, we first introduce a special transformation that will be
used in the protocol.
Definition 6. Let Σ ∈ Sn and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ (F
∗
q)
n such that γi 6= 0 for all i. The transformation Πγ,Σ
is defined as follows:
Πγ,Σ : F
n
q −→ F
n
q
v 7→ (γΣ(1)vΣ(1), . . . , γΣ(n)vΣ(n))
Notice that ∀α ∈ Fq, ∀v ∈ F
n
q , Πγ,Σ(αv) = αΠγ,Σ(v), and wt(Πγ,Σ(v)) = wt(v).
Description The key generation algorithm is as follows: in a first step choose randomly a parity-check
matrix H ∈ Fr×nq and a vector s ∈ F
n
q with weight wt(s) = ω. s identifies the secret key. Finally, perform
HsT to get the vector y ∈ Frq. The public key consists of y, H and ω (see Figure 5).
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KeyGen:
Choose n, r, ω, and q such that WFISD(n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2κ
H
$
←− Fr×nq
s
$
←− Fnq , s.t. wt(s) = ω.
y ← HsT
Output (sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))
Fig. 5. CVE key generation algorithm.
Prover P Verifier V
(sk, pk) = (s, (y,H, ω))←− KeyGen
(h public hash function)
u
$
←− Fnq , Σ
$
←− Sn
γ
$
←− (F∗q)
n
c1 ← h
`
Σ, γ,HuT
´
c2 ← h (Πγ,Σ(u), Πγ,Σ(s))
c1, c2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
α
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− α
$
←− F∗q
β ←− Πγ,Σ(u+ αs)
β
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b
$
←− {0, 1}
If b = 0:
Σ, γ
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1
?
= h(Σ, γ,HΠ−1γ,Σ(β)
T − αy)
Else:
Πγ,Σ(s)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c2
?
= h(β − αΠγ,Σ(s), Πγ,Σ(s)),
wt(Πγ,Σ(s))
?
= ω
Fig. 6. CVE identiﬁcation protocol.
3.4 Signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform
Using the Fiat-Shamir transform [13], respectively its extended version [1], it is possible to transform the
Stern and Véron schemes, respectively the CVE scheme, given above into signature schemes. The idea of
this transformation is to split the identification scheme in two parts.
In the first part, the signer runs the identification scheme as before, but without any verifier involved.
Instead, the signer has to generate the challenges on his own, for instance using a stream cipher with a
predefined start value, which includes the message to sign. On the one hand, the signer can not predict
the next challenge bits, and on the other hand, the procedure must be repeatable by the verifier. In other
words, concerning the challenges, the signer is simulating the role of the verifier, and recording the responses
without any checks.
In the second part, the verifier uses the same stream cipher and starting value and replays the protocol
with the saved responses and performs the necessary checks. This also explains the relatively big signature
sizes of schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir transform as the signer is recording a history of the actions
involved. This history is used by the verifier in the verification process. It also shows the varying sizes of the
signatures, as the given responses change from run to run with high probability.
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4 Implementation
In total, six different schemes have been implemented in C: the Stern, Véron and CVE identification schemes
and the corresponding signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir transform [13, 1].
The implementation assumes that the dimensions of the matrices are a multiple of 64. The public keys G
and H are given in systematic form, i.e. G = [Ik|R] and H = [In−k|R] respectively, where only the redundant
part R is used. In the quasi-cyclic and quasi-dyadic cases, the matrices G and H consist of cyclic and dyadic
submatrices of size 64× 64, because 64 is the natural number to use on a 64-bit machine.
For the generation of random vectors and hash values, we deployed the code-based RFSB-509 hash
function presented by Bernstein et al. [8]. This choice is driven by the intension to base the security of the
schemes on only one hardness assumption, namely the hardness of solving the syndrome decoding problem.
But note that it can be replaced by any other suitable scheme providing the necessary functionality: for
comparison, we also implemented the signature schemes using Keccak [14].
The experiments were performed on an Intel Xeon E5-1602 running at 2.80 GHz, having 8 GB of RAM
and running a 64bit version of Debian 6.0.6.
4.1 Identification schemes
Stern scheme This scheme uses a binary parity check matrix H = [In−k|R] of size r × n, where r = n− k
and k = n/2. For the implementation we used n = 768 and k = 384. Due to the row-major order of C, the
product sHT is more efficient as HsT (s ∈ Fn2 ). Hence, the implementation uses the transposed matrix H
T
instead of H.
Matrix Type Dimension [n× r] Weight Time [ms] Sec. Level[bits]
Random 768× 384 76 2.79 80
Quasi-cyclic 768× 384 76 2.57 80
Quasi-dyadic 768× 384 76 3.78 80
Table 1. Stern timing results for 28 rounds when the impersonation probability is bounded by 2−16.
n
Véron scheme: This scheme uses a binary generator matrix G = [Ik|R] of dimensions k×n, where k = n/2.
Again, in the quasi-cyclic and quasi-dyadic case, the cyclic and dyadic submatrices have a size of 64 × 64
bits, n = 768 and k = 384. As in Stern, if G is quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic, then the submatrix R would
consist of 36 cyclic or dyadic submatrices of size 64× 64 bits.
Matrix Type Dimension [k × n] Weight Time [ms] Sec. Level[bits]
Random 768× 384 76 2.65 80
Quasi-cyclic 768× 384 76 2.47 80
Quasi-dyadic 768× 384 76 3.57 80
Table 2. Véron timing results for 28 rounds when the impersonation probability is bounded by 2−16.
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Memory requirements The memory requirements for the Stern and Véron scheme are as follows: using a
random matrix 384× 384 = 147.456 bits are necessary to store the redundancy part R of H resp. G. Using
quasi-cyclic (quasi-dyadic) matrices, the memory footprint for the matrices drops by a factor of 64. Only
6 × 6 × 64 = 2.304 = 147.456/64 bits are needed. Hence, although the timings using quasi-cyclic (quasi-
dyadic) matrices are worse than for random matrices, in some environments the smaller memory footprint
might compensate for the loss in performance.
CVE scheme It uses a parity check matrix H of size r × n over Fq, where q = 2
m, 1 ≤ m ≤ 16, r = n− k
and k = n/2. As in the Stern scheme, the implementation uses the transposed matrix HT instead of H. If
H is quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic, then the submatrix R would consist of 81 cyclic or dyadic submatrices of
8× 8 field elements.
The matrix size is always measured in numbers of field elements. Each field element occupies invariably
2 bytes of memory. Strictly speaking, this would be necessary only in the case m = 16. However, using only
the necessary bits would complicate the code and slow down the computation. In environments in which
memory is a very valuable resource, this fact had to be taken into account.
For the measurements we used m = 8.
Matrix Type Dimension [n× r] Degree q = 2m Weight Time [ms] Sec. Level[bits]
Random 144× 72 256 55 1.40 80
Quasi-cyclic 144× 72 256 55 1.38 80
Quasi-dyadic 144× 72 256 55 1.67 80
Table 3. CVE timing results for 16 rounds when the impersonation probability is bounded by 2−16.
Memory requirements for the CVE scheme Using a random matrix, 72 × 72 × 2 = 10.368 bytes
are necessary to store the redundancy part R of H resp. G. Using quasi-cyclic (quasi-dyadic) matrices, the
memory footprint for the matrices drops by a factor of 8, because in this case only 9× 9× 8× 2 = 1.296 =
10.368/8 bytes are needed. Again, as with the Stern and Véron scheme, memory savings using the structured
matrix types might be more important than the loss in runtime.
4.2 Signature schemes based on Fiat-Shamir transform
Using the Fiat-Shamir transform [13], one can transform identification schemes to signature schemes. We
describe the process in detail for the Stern scheme (respectively Véron scheme). It is straightforward to adapt
it to the non canonical (more than three-pass) CVE case, see [1] for more details.
Note that the signer and verifier parts are always located in the same executable, thus the two parts can
communicate in almost no time. In reality, they would reside on different machines, such that additional
costs over some communication link had to be taken into account.
4.3 The signing procedure
Let δ the number of rounds needed to achieve the required cheating probability.
In a first step, a commitment CMT is computed as
CMT = (c01, c02, c03) || (c11, c12, c13) || . . . || (cδ−1,1, cδ−1,2, cδ−1,3).
9
More precisely, in each round we run one of the above identification schemes to generate a corresponding
commitment (ci1, ci2, ci3), where 0 ≤ i ≤ δ− 1. Note that the ci1, ci2 and ci3 are hashed values (using RFSB-
509) and that each such triple has 3 × 160 = 480 bits. The number of rounds δ is a predefined value (e.g.
141 for Stern and Véron schemes or 80 for the CVE scheme to achieve a impersonation resistance of 1/280).
All round-triples together form the compound commitment CMT.
In a second step, we compute the challenge CH = h(CMT || M), where h denotes the RFSB-509 hash
function and M is the message, typically the content of some file. CH has a length such that it consists of
twice as many bits as there are rounds, because for each round the signer needs a new challenge. Each two
bits of CH give a partial challenge, where the bit pattern 11 is mapped to b ∈ {0, 1, 2} in a cyclic fashion.
Finally, compute for each partial challenge b the response according to the deployed identification scheme.
Note that the response size for each b varies depending on its actual value of 0, 1 or 2. Denote all responses
by RSP = (r0 || r1 || . . . || rδ−1). The final signature is (CMT || RSP).
4.4 The verification procedure
Upon receiving the signature, the verifier extracts CMT and computes CH = h(CMT || M). As in the
signing step, the verifier uses the individual bytes of CH modulo 3 to obtain δ many challenges b ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Using b, the verifier extracts the corresponding response contained in RSP and calculates the commitment
cij , where j = b and i denotes the current round. Finally, the verifier computes h(cij) of CMT and compares
this value with the cij contained in the triple (ci1, ci2, ci3). We identify here the value h(cij) and cij . In case
the values of cij match for all rounds, the signature is considered valid.
In the following, tables are given for runtime measurement of the three signature schemes derived
from the corresponding identification schemes using the Fiat-Shamir transform.
4.5 Signature scheme timings
Matrix Type Dimension[n×r] Weight
Time[ms]
Keccak RFSB
Msg.[kBytes] Sec.[bits]
Random 768× 384 76 7.18 3.57 7.67 4.88 1 80
768× 384 76 7.32 3.92 7.88 3.70 10 80
768× 384 76 7.49 4.02 8.11 3.93 25 80
Quasi-cyclic 768× 384 76 6.59 3.25 7.01 4.59 1 80
768× 384 76 6.70 3.35 7.18 4.16 10 80
768× 384 76 6.84 3.49 7.44 4.03 25 80
Quasi-dyadic 768× 384 76 10.13 5.61 10.46 6.07 1 80
768× 384 76 10.25 5.64 10.87 4.71 10 80
768× 384 76 10.49 5.65 10.97 7.77 25 80
Table 4. Stern timing results: separate signing and veriﬁcation time (s/v) for 141 rounds.
4.6 Remarks
The signature size in the Stern and Véron schemes is about 25 kBytes and respectively 19 kBytes in the
CVE scheme for 80-bit security. The numbers mean an average value of several runs over 141 resp. 80 rounds.
Note that the signature size is independent from the message to be signed.
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Matrix Type Dimension[n×r] Weight
Time[ms]
Keccak RFSB
Msg.[kBytes] Sec.[bits]
Random 768× 384 76 10.26 4.86 7.98 3.76 1 80
768× 384 76 10.37 5.53 7.99 4.22 10 80
768× 384 76 10.55 5.26 8.33 4.14 25 80
Quasi-cyclic 768× 384 76 9.37 4.80 6.87 3.89 1 80
768× 384 76 9.47 4.92 7.25 3.33 10 80
768× 384 76 9.64 5.07 7.35 3.89 25 80
Quasi-dyadic 768× 384 76 13.79 6.23 11.66 4.17 1 80
768× 384 76 14.23 7.01 11.99 3.88 10 80
768× 384 76 14.02 6.13 12.40 3.65 25 80
Table 5. Véron timing results: separate signing and veriﬁcation time (s/v) for 141 rounds.
Matrix Type Dimension[n×r] Weight
Time[ms]
Keccak RFSB
Msg.[kBytes] Sec.[bits]
Random 144× 72 55 4.25 1.90 4.21 3.73 1 80
144× 72 55 4.38 2.03 4.36 2.40 10 80
144× 72 55 4.59 2.97 4.59 2.30 25 80
Quasi-cyclic 144× 72 55 5.21 2.42 5.20 2.62 1 80
144× 72 55 5.32 2.51 5.31 3.02 10 80
144× 72 55 5.56 3.70 5.55 2.80 25 80
Quasi-dyadic 144× 72 55 4.44 2.07 4.41 2.18 1 80
144× 72 55 4.58 2.13 4.56 2.53 10 80
144× 72 55 4.79 3.13 4.77 2.42 25 80
Table 6. CVE timing results: separate signing and veriﬁcation time (s/v) for 80 rounds.
The runtime is dominated by RFSB creating random vectors u[0], . . . , u[δ − 1] before entering the loop
of 141 resp. 80 rounds, which could also be confirmed profiling the implementation directly with gprof, the
profiler contained in gcc.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described three existing code-based identification and their corresponding signature
schemes and provided running times of their implementation. As a result, we obtain three very fast signature
schemes. Depending on the message size it is possible to sign and verify in the order of milliseconds, but at
the cost of very long signature sizes: typically 19 kBytes for CVE and 25 kBytes bytes for Stern resp. Véron.
The source code of the C implementation is available under the following link:
http://cayrel.net/research/code-based-cryptography/code-based-cryptosystems/article/
implementation-of-code-based-zero.
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